offence to assist a patient to kill themselves. 10 Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, 11 hospital Trusts may be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter where patients die as a result of gross systemic negligence. In terms of civil liability, the law of negligence may compensate a self-harming patient whose actions result from a breach of their clinician's duty of care. 12 A claim may also be brought under either the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 or the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. 13 Finally, mental health practitioners are regulated by their respective professional bodies which are able to impose disciplinary sanctions. 14 In addition to requiring such a comprehensive framework, the positive obligations in article 2 include two distinct duties; hereafter referred to as the 'investigatory duty' 15 and the 'protective duty'. 16 The former obliges 17 the State to adequately investigate death or near-death 18 and lies beyond the scope of this paper. The latter arises only in limited circumstances and requires public authorities to take steps to protect endangered life. The case of Savage v South Essex Partnership N.H.S. Foundation Trust considers the appropriate test to be used in determining whether this protective duty has been violated. After providing an overview of the case, I shall analyse its implications by drawing comparisons with the position at common law as discussed in G v Central and North West London Mental Health NHS Trust. 19 
The Facts and Judgments to Date
With the trial yet to have taken place, and permission to appeal having been given granted by the House of Lords, the reported judgments contain very little detail regarding the facts of the case. The day after voluntarily attending Runwell Hospital, Mrs Carol Savage was detained for treatment of her paranoid schizophrenia under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 ('MHA'). With a long history of mental illness, she was kept on an open acute psychiatric ward. It is alleged that, despite making a number of attempts to leave, she was left unsupervised on hospital grounds because she was considered to be at low In Takoushis, 25 Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. had endorsed the view 26 that 'simple negligence' resulting in a patient's death 'was not sufficient in itself' to breach the positive obligations in article 2, adding that the position 'is or may be different in a case in which gross negligence or manslaughter is alleged'. Perhaps constrained by precedent, Swift J. declared 27 that the proper test for establishing a violation of article 2 was 'at least gross negligence of a kind sufficient to sustain a charge of manslaughter'. In light of her Ladyship's earlier comments, this test would presumably have been applicable to both detained and voluntary patients. As gross negligence was never alleged, the judge made an order for summary judgment against the claimant.
On appeal 28
The maintained but to some extent blurred' 30 the distinction between custody and hospital cases. The case was 'of considerable interest' 31 as the State was held to be liable for a prisoner's death which resulted from the negligence of hospital staff. Although their Lordships understood the analogy drawn by Swift J., they considered the position of detained patients to be more akin to that of prisoners than to that of ordinary patients. The 'critical point' was that both groups were 'particularly vulnerable' and 'under the control of the state in a way in which ordinary patients are not '. 32 This was the case whether or not they were detained on a locked or unlocked ward. There was therefore no reason to afford those detained under the MHA 1983 any less rights under article 2 than those detained in prison or prison hospitals. Voluntary mental patients were vulnerable but in 'a rather different way' and whether or not a different test should apply to them, that was not the position at common law as the same duty of care was owed.
In a somewhat dramatic volte-face, the Court distanced itself from the 'probably obiter' comments it had made in Takoushis. Its previous reference to simple and gross negligence was not part of that decision, nor was the distinction drawn between detained and voluntary patients. 33 Thereby released from the shackles of precedent, the Court unanimously held 34 that it was not necessary to establish gross negligence or anything more serious. Instead, the Osman test 35 should apply in determining whether the positive obligation in article 2 had been breached. Thus, the claimant had to show that:
'… at the material time the Trust knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of Mrs Savage from self-harm and that it failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.'
Elaborating upon these elements, the Master of the Rolls endorsed the view 36 that 'a real risk is one that is objectively justified and an immediate risk is one that is present and continuing'. This set a 'high test'. The appeal was therefore allowed and the action would proceed to trial. The judgment, however, concluded with the uncertain remark: 'While we would not prohibit [Ms Savage] from arguing at the trial for a lower test, we see no warrant for such a lower test …'
Comment
These proceedings are the first to identify the appropriate threshold for the protective duty in a medical negligence context. While the Court of Appeal's adoption of the Osman test is a welcome development, it is submitted that its reasons for doing so could have been clearer. I shall first contend that Mrs Savage's detention status was not relevant as the Osman test is applicable to any patient, detained or otherwise. Secondly, it will be noted that the scope of this test is qualified by its elements so as to severely restrict the circumstances in which public authorities are likely to violate their protective duty. Finally, the potential repercussions of the Savage proceedings for the law of medical negligence will be briefly considered.
(a) Unnecessary analogies and frail distinctions
The Court of Appeal's justification for rejecting the gross negligence threshold in favour of the Osman test appears to be that patients detained for treatment under section 3 of the MHA 1983 are in an 
(b) The Osman elements
Rather than referring to detention status, a clearer approach might be to rely upon the elements of the Osman test to prescribe the necessary trigger for invoking the protective duty. Thus, the duty will be owed to any identifiable patient whenever hospital staff are aware, or ought to be aware, of a real and immediate risk to that person's life. This degree of foresight sets a very high threshold which will not be readily satisfied. 49 For no question can be raised under article 2 unless the staff have such actual or constructive knowledge of the risk. 50 The nature of that risk will also be important because the patient must present an objectively justified risk to life; a risk of serious injury resulting from self-harm would not suffice, although this distinction may in practice be occasionally difficult to draw. 51 In addition, the real risk must be present and continuing at the time of the alleged violation; if its immediacy subsided before the expectation to take precautions arose, the necessary causal link will not have been established.
Contrast this clear formula with the line of judicial authority 52 which favours a variable threshold of risk, tailored to the particular circumstances of the case. It purports to water down the Osman elements for individuals whose lives have been put at risk by the actions of the State; for example, those in a 'special category of vulnerable persons' or those required by the State to perform certain duties on its behalf. Their enhanced status, it is said, entitles them to expect a 'reasonable level of protection' which is achieved by interpreting any risk as a 'real risk' and interpreting 'immediate' to simply mean 'present and continuing'. It is this 'lower test' which the Court of Appeal in Savage may have been referring to in its concluding remark, although it rightly saw no warrant for it. Indeed, it is submitted that the approach to be preferred is that endorsed by the House in In re Officer L: '… the standard is constant and not variable with the type of act in contemplation, and is not easily reached.' 53 Requiring the real risk to life to be immediate in the sense of being 'present and continuing' avoids frail distinctions, for example between those who may, or may not, be vulnerable, and is non-discriminatory in nature.
Returning to G, in the week before her suicide attempt at Baker Street Tube station, the patient absconded, withdrew money and bought a map of the infamous Beachy Head. She also preoccupied staff with discussions about the unit's suicide rate. Although no claim was brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, it is certainly arguable that there was a real and immediate risk to G's life at the time her consultant decided to continue with unescorted leave around hospital grounds. Moreover, the staff knew, or at least ought to have known, of that risk. In those circumstances, it is submitted that her informal detention status should not prevent the protective duty being owed, though not necessarily breached, in these circumstances. 1375 para 16; and Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2008] CSIH 19 at paras 63-65. 53 [2007] 1 WLR 2135 at para 20.
Satisfying the Osman elements serves only to trigger the State's protective duty. To establish its breach, the claimant must go on to prove that the authorities failed to do all that was reasonably to be expected of them to avoid the risk to life. The European jurisprudence embraces the principle of proportionality in this regard: Such a wide margin of appreciation aims to strike a fair balance between individual and community rights. It requires the Court to consider the precautionary options available to hospital staff, their likely effectiveness and the reasonableness of implementing them. This will take into account how difficult it may be to implement the precautions and the resources available. The protective duty, therefore, does not require staff to guard against every risk to life; in fact it would be impossible to satisfy such an absolute standard. Indeed, to do so may well threaten their therapeutic relationship with the patient.
Rather than applying a 'but for' test to determine whether the materialised risk could be said to be 'caused' by the State's actions or omissions, the test employed by the Court of Appeal mirrors the causative language used by the ECtHR in Osman. 55 Thus, the State will be liable if it fails to take protective measures 'which, judged reasonably, might be expected to avoid' the risk to life. With the Osman elements setting a high threshold for triggering the protective duty, this 'reasonable expectation' test for causation seems appropriately generous to claimants and conforms to European jurisprudence. Unlike the stricter test adopted in Van Colle, 56 which requires the measures to have had 'a real prospect of altering the outcome', it relinquishes the claimant from having to prove that matters would have turned out differently had the relevant precaution been taken. This ensures that the right to life is afforded real and effective protection in domestic law.
(c) Implications for the law of negligence
Were the House of Lords to adopt the Osman test and permit the Savage case to proceed to trial, assuming the Osman elements are satisfied so as to trigger the protective duty, the human rights issue will be whether her consultant failed to take measures within the scope of her powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid the risk to life. This can be contrasted with the G case where the negligence issue was whether her consultant acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of practitioners skilled in the relevant field. 57 The common law duty of care can be seen to be covering much the same ground as the Convention right. Yet an alleged breach of the former will be determined according to the deferential Bolam 58 test whilst an alleged violation of the latter will call for 54 Ibid n 35 at para 116; see also Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) Adopting the Osman test is likely to exacerbate the recent tremors in the law of negligence. 60 The judiciary have begun to evolve the duty of care owed by the police so as to act compatibly with the Convention. 61 Whether the Bolam test provides the necessary degree of scrutiny must now be in doubt 62 as the contemporary view seems to be that compartmentalising human rights and negligence actions is not an acceptable way for the law to develop. Although the judiciary is not duty-bound to do more than the Strasbourg Court, it must certainly do no less. 63 Might this therefore be the beginning of the end for Bolam? 64
Conclusion
Assessing the risk of suicide is an inherently unreliable exercise; 65 after all, 'psychiatry is not an exact science '. 66 This may explain why at their final point of contact with mental health services, immediate suicide risk was estimated to be low or absent for 86% of the deceased. 67 The cases of Savage and G vividly illustrate the potential for human error.
It has been argued that the protective duty is triggerable for all patients, regardless of their detention status, once the heavily qualified elements of the Osman test have been established. The margin of appreciation permitted by European jurisprudence in determining whether that duty has been breached should, it is hoped, discourage clinicians from engaging in defensive practice. In these early stages of articles 2's development into the health care setting, a careful legal balance must be struck between risk and liberty, between paternalism and self-determination. If suicide prevention is to be a national priority, obliging mental health services to take reasonable steps to protect life in limited circumstances would surely be a positive, and not unduly onerous, judicial development.
